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Taciturn, reserved, reclusive, emotionless, Suharto ruled Indonesia for thirty-two 
years as a mystery man, a dictator who presented himself as a faceless, replaceable 
figure in an apolitical administration. His speeches were dull, forgettable affairs filled 
with mind-numbing bureaucratese, worn cliches, and pious homilies. There is not a 
single statement by which he is remembered today. If asked, Indonesians struggle in 
vain to recall some memorable phrase from him, while even the youth can quote 
Sukarno, the president he overthrew in 1965. Suharto has left behind a wordless 
memory.
Rarely interviewed but frequently photographed, Suharto is remembered by a 
gesture: a smile. It was how he wished to be known, and so his 1969 authorized 
biography is titled The Smiling General.1 It was a Cheshire cat smile, fixed in place, 
concealing, not expressing his emotional life, prompting instead puzzlement about the 
intrigues and violence that were being conjured up in the mind behind it.
Given Suharto's character, it is only fitting that his parentage is also a matter of 
mystery. In his "autobiography," co-written by the man most responsible for crafting 
Suharto's public image, Brigadier General G. Dwipayana, Suharto claims he was born 
to a poor peasant family in the village of Kemusuk, near Yogyakarta.2 Yet a magazine 
associated with his trusted military intelligence czar, Ali Moertopo, claimed in 1974 
that Suharto's father had been an aristocrat. In what was perhaps a pre-planned 
response, Suharto invited journalists to his office in the presidential palace to explain 
his lineage and produce witnesses who could vouch that he was the true salt of the 
earth.3 Despite his protestations, his genealogy remains suspect. Among Indonesians it 
is widely rumored that he was the illegitimate child of a Chinese businessman.
Whatever Suharto's origins and childhood experiences, his adulthood was clearly 
that of a career soldier. He enlisted in the Dutch military in 1940, an event he mentions 
in his autobiography as "the key to opening a door to a pleasant walk of life."4 The
1 O. G. Roeder, The Smiling General: President Soeharto of Indonesia (Jakarta: Gunung Agung, 1969).
2 Soeharto, Soeharto: Pikiran, Ucapan, dan Tindakan Saya, seperti dipaparkan kepada G. Dwipayana dan 
RamadhanK. H. (Jakarta: PT. Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, 1989), pp. 6-8. The publishing company was 
owned by one of Suharto's daughters.
3 Angus McIntyre, The Indonesian Presidency: The Shift from Personal toward Constitutional Rule (Lanham,
MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), pp. 108-9.
4 Soeharto, Soeharto, p. 19.
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pleasant life of marching and drilling continued under the Japanese occupation when 
he became a member of that colonial state's militia. Like all other militiamen, he joined 
the newly created Indonesian national army once the Japanese military surrendered, in 
August 1945. There was no question of going back to serve with the Dutch—they had 
already been stripped of all their power and wealth by the Japanese and had suffered 
the war years in squalid concentration camps.
Because of his military training, Suharto was given a high rank (lieutenant colonel) 
in the new Indonesian army that organized itself to fight a guerrilla war against the 
returning Dutch troops. By 1948, he had become the commander of a brigade of troops 
stationed in and around Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic. The army's guerrilla 
attacks did little to slow the advance of the Dutch troops. Despite having the home- 
field advantage, Suharto was caught by surprise on December 19, 1948, when Dutch 
troops invaded Yogyakarta and captured it the same day without facing any 
resistance. Inexplicably, all four of Suharto's battalions were outside the city. It was 
one of the worst setbacks for the Republic: its two highest leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, 
were captured.
Suharto had a chance to redeem himself when he led an attack on Yogyakarta in 
March 1949. The attack inflicted only minor damage to the Dutch troops occupying the 
city and was repulsed within six hours. Suharto and other army commanders, 
however, claimed that they had temporarily held the city and thereby proved the 
might of the Republic's forces to the world. After Suharto took power in 1965, the 
event was turned into the decisive victory of the war for independence, with a film 
made about it, Janur Kuning (1979), and a grand monument built in the city (1985).
As a man who served in three different armies within the span of a decade, Suharto 
wore his political commitments lightly. One of his army colleagues later told a 
journalist that Suharto said in 1948, "My politics are at the end of the bayonet."5 No 
wonder that Sukarno and his left-leaning defense minister, Amir Sjarifuddin, had 
introduced political commissars into the army. Like many soldiers trained under 
Dutch and Japanese officers, Suharto had no experience in the popular nationalist 
movement that had struggled against imperialism.
After independence was won in 1949, Suharto rose up through the ranks: colonel, 
brigadier general, major general. His one setback came in 1959, when he was removed 
from the command of the Central Java troops for corruption. But the affair was hushed 
up, and he was quickly rehabilitated. Thereafter he was put in charge of the operation 
to seize West Papua from the Dutch in 1962—an operation that was aborted after a 
last-minute diplomatic agreement. He was then shifted to Jakarta, in 1963, and given 
command over the army reserves, Kostrad. With an undistinguished record, 
rudimentary education, and no ability in a foreign language, he was a prime candidate 
for the highest position in the army by 1965, serving as the replacement for the army 
commander, Yani, whenever he traveled abroad.
Suharto had risen to the top of an army that was becoming a kind of parallel 
government, using its territorial commands, originally designed for defense against
5 David Jenkins, Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics, 1975-1983 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p. 33.
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foreign invasion, for ruling over civil society. Most of his fellow generals, including the 
senior-most, A. H. Nasution, were strongly anti-communist and determined to check 
the rising power of the communist party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) in the early 
1960s. To rival the party, they sponsored trade unions, artists' associations, and 
newspapers. They met with religious organizations and political parties and assured 
them that the army would use force if need be against the PKI.
Suharto did not clearly associate himself with either side. A former PKI member of 
the parliament told me that D. N. Aidit, the head of the party, believed that Suharto 
was a "democratic" officer because in 1963 he had supported the ending of the army's 
martial law powers.6 But Suharto was also collaborating with the anti-communists in 
his covert effort to put the brakes on Sukarno's anti-Malaysia campaign, begun in 1963.
Suharto's fence-sitting ultimately proved to be what brought him to power. When 
the pro-PKI and pro-Sukarno army officers decided to strike against their rival officers, 
they assumed Suharto would support them. A group of junior officers organized the 
raids to kidnap seven army generals on October 1, 1965. Two of the conspirators, 
Colonel Abdul Latief and Lieutenant Colonel Untung, were good friends of Suharto. 
Latief, when put on trial in 1978, claimed that he had told Suharto beforehand about 
the plot. The abductors, calling themselves the September 30th Movement, wound up 
killing six generals, among them the army commander, Yani. It was Suharto's lucky 
day. In Yani's absence he became army commander. The September 30th Movement 
had not been masterminded by Suharto, but it played into his hands perfectly.7
As army commander, Suharto immediately began defying presidential orders and 
implementing the long-standing agenda of the anti-communist officers, which was to 
reduce Sukarno to a figurehead president, destroy the PKI, and establish a military 
dictatorship. Suharto's anti-communism did not stem from any deep-seated 
ideological commitment. If the September 30th Movement had succeeded and the 
communists had gained more power, one can easily imagine the ever-opportunistic 
Suharto accommodating himself to the new regime. He was such a nondescript, 
unremarkable officer that many observers believed in the first weeks of October that he 
was merely following General Nasution's lead.
Sidelining President Sukarno turned out not to be too difficult. The grand old man 
of Indonesian nationalism, the "extension of the people's tongue," kept voicing 
protests but did nothing concrete to stop Suharto's guns. He confirmed Suharto as 
army commander, raised his rank, and gave him emergency powers. The coup de 
grace of this gradual coup d'etat came in March 1966, when Suharto used a vaguely 
worded order from Sukarno about "guaranteeing security" as a justification for 
arresting fifteen ministers and dismissing Sukarno's cabinet—as if the president had 
ordered his own overthrow.
The destruction of the PKI—the precondition for imposing a new military- 
dominated polity—turned out not to be too difficult, either. The PKI leadership, in 
disarray after October 1, urged its followers not to resist so that President Sukarno
6 Oey Hay Djoen, personal communication, lanuary 9, 2008.
7 John Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'Etat in Indonesia 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), chapter 6.
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could arrange a political resolution to the crisis. But the president had no power over 
Suharto's army. Working with civilian militias, the army organized one of the worst 
bloodbaths of the twentieth century, rounding up over one million people and then 
secretly executing many of them. Detainees disappeared at night. Mass graves holding 
uncounted corpses lie unmarked all over Sumatra, Java, and Bali.
No document exists proving that Suharto ordered any killing. In later years, on the 
rare occasion when he mentioned the killings, he blamed civilians for running amok. 
Serious investigations into the "who, where, when, and how" of the killings reveal that 
the army was primarily responsible and that Suharto must have at least approved of 
them if he did not give an explicit oral or written order for them.8
In taking power, Suharto and his fellow army officers realized that the long-term 
stability of their rule would depend on their ability to improve Indonesians' living 
standards. They looked to foreign aid, investment, and markets to provide the main 
stimuli for economic growth. Western capitalists, who had been boycotting Indonesia 
because of Sukarno's policies, found the welcome mat laid out. Suharto personally 
intervened in late 1965 to stop Sukarno's minister of industries from nationalizing the 
oil sector. With the army's terror campaign against unionists working at oil wells, 
rubber plantations, and factories, Western capital was assured a docile labor force.9
One reason for Suharto's remarkable ability to stay in power for so long lies in his 
expansion of public-sector employment. By the end of his reign, 4.6 million people 
were on the state payroll, about triple the number in the early 1970s. Millions more 
were dependents of these salary earners. The security of the monthly paycheck was 
attractive, even if the income was low. Also, some government jobs came with chances 
to earn more money through corruption. These civil servants and their relatives were 
the regime's key base of support, voting and campaigning for the government party, 
Golkar, in every election. Those who did not support Golkar were denounced for 
biting the hand that fed them and stood little chance of earning a promotion.
Suharto's habitual response to dissent was, to use today's lexicon, shock and awe. 
In Papua, he maintained an occupation army that treated the indigenous population as 
sub-humans whose loyalty had to be won through violence. For years, the only face of 
Indonesia that Papuans saw was that of the army. Suharto was responsible for the tens 
of thousands of Papuans killed in the counterinsurgency campaign from the late 1960s 
to 1998. He was also responsible for the war of aggression against East Timor in 1975, 
where over 100,000 people died. He was also responsible for the deaths of thousands of 
Acehnese who were victims of yet another counterinsurgency campaign (1990-1998) 
designed to terrorize civilians into not supporting the guerrillas, instead of offering the 
civilians a more positive alternative.
Suharto stubbornly pursued the same strategy even when it proved to be 
counterproductive, for instance, when the terror inflicted in Papua, East Timor, and 
Aceh generated widespread resistance. Only after Suharto's downfall have Indonesian
8 See Roosa, Pretext for Mass Murder, pp. 21-31.
9 Brad Simpson, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and U S.-Indonesian Relations, 1960-1968 
(Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). Also see the collection of US government documents 
about Suharto that Simpson has posted at www.gwu.edu/ ~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB242/index.htm, 
the National Security Archive website.
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politicians had the chance to pursue wiser, more humane diplomatic and political 
resolutions to these wars: President Habibie allowed a UN-administered referendum 
in East Timor in 1999 and President Yudhoyono concluded a peace treaty with the 
Acehnese nationalists in 2005.
In evaluating Suharto's rule, the so-called "balanced" approach of many Western 
scholars has been to criticize Suharto for human-rights violations but to praise his 
economic performance. Those impressed by the country's high annual growth rates 
(6.6 percent was the average over his three decades) are like gullible investors in a 
Ponzi scheme, convinced that the high returns are irrefutable evidence of success. The 
economic growth of the Suharto years was largely accomplished by wildly selling off 
the country's natural resources. It was a predatory, unsustainable type of growth. The 
leading sectors were oil and timber. Both were terribly mismanaged because of the 
corruption. Today, Indonesia imports more oil than it exports, and much of its forest 
cover has disappeared. What forest remains is being rapidly cut down by loggers or 
burned up by palm oil plantation owners. The revenues from all those exports were 
not reinvested in other sectors; they disappeared into the personal bank accounts of 
Suharto family members, their cronies (such as the "king of the jungle," the timber 
tycoon Bob Hasan), and state officials.
Suharto's proudest moment came in 1985 when the Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) presented him with an award for having raised rice production in 
Indonesia to the point that the country no longer needed to import rice. The first 
chapter in his "autobiography" was an account of his speech at the award ceremony in 
Rome. For Suharto, it was a moment when a simple peasant from Central Java had 
attained international recognition for improving the lives of his fellow peasants. The 
award turned out to be undeserved. The growth rates in rice production had risen 
during the 1977-82 period but had begun declining thereafter.10 The government 
consistently neglected the agricultural infrastructure and encouraged the conversion of 
Java's paddy fields into suburban and industrial zones. By the 1990s, Indonesia was 
back to importing large quantities of rice.11
The entire agricultural sector was mismanaged during the Suharto years, partly 
because the state procurement agency, Bulog, was a major source of the officialdom's 
slush funds. The production of nearly all staple foods failed to meet domestic demand. 
Today, Indonesia imports massive quantities of soybeans, sugar, and wheat. 
Meanwhile, villagers are fleeing from the fields in droves, seeking employment as 
migrant workers in the Mideast, East Asia, and neighboring countries in Southeast 
Asia. Sukarno used to say that Indonesia was a nation of coolies. Sadly, after three 
decades of economic growth a la Suharto, it remains that. In a globalized world of 
ruthless competition, the country remains locked in its age-old position as supplier of 
raw materials and poor laborers for the world market. An absurd myopia afflicts those 
today who nostalgically recall the "better" economic conditions of the Suharto years 
without seeing how Suharto's policies contributed to the current, seemingly unsolvable 
problems of high unemployment, high prices, and mass poverty.
10 P. Simatupang and C. P. Timmer, "Indonesian Rice Production: Policies and Realities," Bulletin o f
Indonesian Economic Studies 44,1 (2008): 65-80.
11 L. P. Rosner and N. McCulloch, "A Note on Rice Production, Consumption, and Import Data in 
Indonesia," Bulletin o f Indonesian Economic Studies 44,1 (2008): 88-89.
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When he resigned in 1998, Suharto left the government heavily in debt and the 
economy without a domestically financed industrial base. To get an idea of the wasted 
opportunities, one can simply compare the record of Malaysia's state-owned oil 
company, Petronas, with Indonesia's Pertamina. With smaller oil reserves, the former 
outperforms the latter in nearly every way (e.g., profitability, transparency, size of its 
investments in foreign countries). It is fitting that Suharto, whose parliament of 
minions anointed him with the title "the father of development" in 1983, passed away 
in the hospital owned by Pertamina, a company his family and cronies (such as Ibnu 
Sutowo) milked with abandon.
The Suharto regime lived by foreign capital and it died by foreign capital. With 
encouragement from the United States, the regime liberalized the country's financial 
system further in the late 1980s by relaxing regulations, removing government 
oversight, and opening it up to foreign capital.12 For many of Jakarta's business 
oligarchs, practiced in the arts of rent-seeking, banking became a new way of stealing 
money. As they went on a borrowing spree, racking up billions of dollars in bad loans, 
Indonesia became much more vulnerable to sudden shifts in international capital 
flows. In 1997, the money that had flowed into the hands of Suharto's caste of 
kleptocrats and their phony banks suddenly flooded out. The grand Ponzi scheme 
collapsed with the Asian economic crisis.
The only legitimacy that Suharto had enjoyed was his apparent ability to engineer 
economic growth. Once that ended, the usually compliant middle-class citizens turned 
on him, unwilling to tolerate his corruption, greedy children, and obscenely wealthy 
cronies. The spontaneously formed movement for reformasi declared its main enemy to 
be KKN: Korupsi, Kolusi, and Nepotisme. The Suharto family's own "I Love the 
Rupiah" campaign, coming from those who held the most dollars, did not quite have 
the same cachet.
Suharto and his family's extensive stable of paranormals could not save them, and 
neither could their obsequious army generals, not even Lieutenant General Prabowo, 
Suharto's son-in-law, who commanded elite troops in Jakarta and was always flush 
with money from his brother who owned the country's one steel mill. Suharto resigned 
on May 21, 1998, as Jakarta was still smouldering from the mysterious riots during 
which stores owned by Indonesian-Chinese were torched.
Perhaps the best that can be said of Suharto's thirty-two-year reign is that it could 
have been worse. He did not opt for the strategy of the Burmese generals and close off 
the country. Dependent upon foreign capital, he was vulnerable to international 
pressure. The release of tens of thousands of political prisoners in the late 1970s was 
largely due to pressure from outside the country. He did not opt to legitimate himself 
through religion and impose Islamic law. The Indonesian state remained largely 
secular. He did not promote a cult of personality around himself. When faced with 
mass protests in 1998, he did not opt to stay in power at all costs.
The late, great Indonesian writer Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a political prisoner of 
Suharto's for fourteen years, once wrote that he could not bring himself to write about
12 J. Pincus and R. Ramli, "From Showcase to Basket Case," Cambridge Journal o f Economics 22 (1998): 
723-34.
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the Suharto regime. While he wrote many historical novels about precolonial Java and 
the Indonesian nationalist movement, he thought nothing interesting could be said 
about the man responsible for imprisoning him and banning his books. For him, 
Suharto was a negativity, what he called a "minus x," a reversion back to Java's 
colonial-era aristocrats who bullied their subjects for the benefit of European business 
interests, yet prided themselves on their great cosmic powers, and remained narrow­
minded and indifferent to the science and arts of the Europe that had conquered 
them.13 No doubt some will remember Suharto for something positive, but, as 
Indonesia struggles to overcome Suharto's terrible legacies, one wonders whether 
anyone will be able to consider his title, "father of development," as anything other 
than a cruel joke.
[A shorter version of this obituary originally appeared on the website of the online 
magazine Inside Indonesia: www.insideindonesia.org—Ed.]
13 Pramoedya Ananta Toer, "My Apologies, in the Name of Experience," trans. Alex Bardsley, Indonesia 61 
(April 1996): 1-14.
